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Indian philosophy has a long and rich history. Numerous texts have survived, and we know 
that many others have been lost. Many thinkers were involved in writing these texts, and 
many more studied them. The contents of these texts have been researched, and are still 
researched, by modern scholars in many countries. These studies inform us what Indian 
philosophy was about. We learn from them that there were many different schools of 
philosophy, and also thinkers who did not belong to any one school in particular, who rather 
elaborated ideas of their own. By and large these thinkers, and their ideas, were associated 
with the main religions of South Asia. Brahmanical thinkers produced philosophies that are 
brahmanical, Jainas produced jaina philosophies, and Buddhists produced buddhist 
philosophies. This distinction into some major groups is only approximate, for the different 
philosophies influenced each other. We know that the Jainas were deeply interested in the 
philosophical developments that took place around them. The buddhist and brahmanical 
thinkers, too, followed closely what others had to say. They informed themselves about the 
ideas of others, and frequently borrowed some of these, often without explicitly saying so. 
The shared concerns of all these philosophers — whether brahmanical, buddhist, or jaina — is 
also attested by the fact that they had a number of problems and concerns in common. They 
may have provided different answers to shared problems, but the fact that their problems were 
sometimes the same shows that these different philosophers were not isolated from each other. 
 Who were these philosophers, and why did they compose their sometimes difficult 
treatises? Asking this question means showing an interest in the context of the different Indian 
philosophies. We can, of course, ignore this question and concentrate exclusively on the 
contents, rather than on the contexts, of India’s philosophical texts. Much can be learned from 
analyzing their contents, even about the relationships between the different schools. The texts 
themselves often criticize alternative positions, and argue against them. Modern scholars can 
analyze these arguments, and evaluate them. This is what modern scholars often do, and 
rightly so. In one sense, this is all the modern scholar who is interested in philosophy has to 
do. The philosophical arguments are all there in the text, they are part of the contents, and not 
of the context. And yet, other issues may be at stake, issues that do not, or only superficially 
or indirectly, find expression in the texts themselves. In some cases a discussion about a 
highly technical point of philosophy may cover a difference of opinion of a much more banal 
kind. 
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 In order to illustrate this observation, I will first briefly mention a relatively recent 
Sanskrit author who was both a philosopher and a grammarian.1 I take this example because 
here, exceptionally, we have a fair amount of contextual information. The name of this scholar 
was Bha††oji, or Bha††oji D¥k∑ita, and he lived around the year 1600 CE in Benares. Bha††oji 
has remained famous until today as a result of a number of technical grammatical treatises 
which he composed. The most well-known of these is the Siddhånta Kaumud¥, a text which is 
still used in India to teach Sanskrit grammar to students. Another text composed by Bha††oji is 
a long and extremely learned commentary on his own Siddhånta Kaumud¥ (called Prau∂ha 
Manoramå). Whereas the Siddhånta Kaumud¥ was written for students, this commentary is 
meant for specialists. One has to be quite advanced in traditional Sanskrit grammar in order to 
understand it, and one might be inclined to think that this learned text is very far removed 
from the every day life of its author. A closer study reveals that this is not the case. 
 Bha††oji’s commentary, in its learned discussions, frequently compares different points 
of view, different interpretations of the ancient grammar of Påˆini. Bha††oji discusses these 
interpretations, discards some of them, and accepts others. Rarely does he specify who held 
the interpretations he discards, with the result that the text makes the impression of being an 
even-handed discussion of ideas, without entering into personal matters. 
 Bha††oji’s contemporaries knew better. Those among them who were themselves 
learned grammarians, knew that many of the views discarded in this commentary, were the 
views of Bha††oji’s teacher, i.e., the scholar from whom Bha††oji had learned grammar to 
begin with. And criticizing one’s teacher, in the milieu to which Bha††oji belonged, was an 
extremely serious matter. Instead of showing respect to his teacher, Bha††oji was here doing 
the opposite. Bha††oji did not use inappropriate words, certainly. He did not even admit that he 
was criticizing his teacher, and modern scholars might not have noticed it. But the 
descendants and other pupils of his teacher needed no time to find out what was happening, 
and they reacted. They wrote grammatical treatises which tried to destroy all the points of 
view which Bha††oji had presented as his own. Once again, the style of these treatises is very 
learned and highly technical. There are only some odd remarks, usually at the beginning or 
end of these treatises, which reveal that their authors held a personal grudge against Bha††oji, 
that they could not forgive him for having behaved in an inappropriate manner toward their 
teacher. 
 But why did Bha††oji behave in this inappropriate manner? The situation is not 
completely clear, but it seems likely that there were reasons for this which our texts do not 
even hint at. One explanation that has been suggested is the fact that Bha††oji and his teacher 
had different religious affiliations. Both were, of course, Brahmins, and both were Vedåntins. 
But whereas Bha††oji was an Advaita Vedåntin, his teacher was a follower of the school of 
Vedånta created by Madhva some centuries earlier. We know about these religious affiliations 
                         
1 For details, see Bronkhorst, 2005. 
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from other sources. The grammatical treatises of Bha††oji, his teacher, and all the others who 
became involved in this long drawn-out debate, do not mention this issue. It is only our 
knowledge of the context which allows us to guess what was going on below the surface of 
polished and erudite discussions of details of Sanskrit grammar. 
 I have taken the example of Bha††oji because, being a relatively recent author, we can 
find out things about him and his personal life. His own works, but also those of his teacher, 
and those of some of his critics, have been preserved, and with them various introductory 
verses and final colophons that throw light upon the situation. Besides this, there are other 
sources of information that have survived, and which allow us to piece together a coherent 
picture of what happened. We know a lot about Bha††oji and his family: we know the name of 
his father and of various other members of his family; we also know the names of some of his 
pupils and the pupils of his pupils. We are similarly informed about his teacher and the 
children and pupils of his teacher. And we have works composed by many of these people, 
and other information about their lives. In some cases we know who financially supported 
these scholars. 
About earlier philosophers in India we do not have such detailed information. Great 
and important thinkers of classical India, among them the Buddhist Någårjuna and the 
Vedåntin Ía∫kara, remain completely unknown to us, except through their own works. We are 
not sure when exactly Någårjuna and Ía∫kara lived, or where they wrote the works that made 
them famous. We do not know the names of their fathers and of their pupils. We do not know 
for sure at what age they died, and whether their lives had been peaceful or otherwise. We are 
ignorant as to who supported them, and what encouragement they received from their 
surroundings. And what I have just said about Någårjuna and Ía∫kara — perhaps the two 
most famous philosophers of classical India — is equally true for practically all other Indian 
philosophers of that period. Sometimes there are legends, but these legends are often late and 
unreliable, or mere inventions. All this makes it extremely difficult to situate the philosophers 
of classical India in their respective contexts. The temptation to abandon hope and to 
concentrate exclusively on the contents of the surviving texts is therefore great. 
 However, I am of the opinion that this would be a mistake. We need all the contextual 
information we can get about our philosophers, for sometimes this is the only way to 
understand what underlies their philosophical thinking. Sometimes, as in the case of the 
grammarian Bha††oji, the deeper motivation may be philosophically insignificant, such as a 
family feud or a difference in sectarian affiliation. In other cases the deeper motivation is of 
great philosophical interest. As an example I will briefly present a case to which attention was 
drawn a few years ago by a Swiss scholar, Vincent Eltschinger. He discusses it in his book 
«Caste» et philosophie bouddhique (“Caste” and buddhist philosophy) that came out in 2000. 
 Buddhist and brahmanical philosophers of the first millennium CE were engaged in a 
long and technical debate about the existence of universals. At first sight this is a purely 
philosophical question, with parallels in the history of European philosophy. The question, as 
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it presents itself in India, can be explained with the help of a simple example. We know that 
the nouns of our language can be used to designate a large number of objects. The word 
“cow”, for example, can be used not just for one cow, but for all the cows that exist in the 
present, in the past, and in the future. The same can be said about practically all other nouns, 
such as “house” or “car”. If we stick to the example “cow”, we may wonder whether all these 
cows — past, present, and future — have something in common that justifies this common 
denomination. Is there such a  thing as “cow-ness”, a universal that is different from each 
single cow but that is yet connected with each of them? The same about houses: is there a 
universal “house-ness” that justifies the application of the word “house” to so many different 
objects? Brahmanical philosophers had a tendency to accept that such universals exist; 
buddhist thinkers denied their existence. 
 This purely philosophical debate took a special turn in the seventh century with 
Kumårila Bha††a, a brahmanical thinker, and Dharmak¥rti, a Buddhist. Kumårila applied his 
belief in the existence of universals to the classes, or “castes”, of society. Being a Brahmin, he 
claimed that all Brahmins share a universal “Brahmin-ness”, which distinguishes them 
fundamentally from all other human beings, just as the universal “cow-ness” separates all 
cows from other animals, such as horses. Dharmak¥rti and his followers did not accept this 
line of reasoning. They did not think that Brahmins were essentially different from other 
human beings. 
 Here, then, we see how a purely philosophical debate took on a social dimension, 
dictated by the fundamental interests of the philosophers involved. In studying these debates it 
is imperative to know the different social backgrounds to which thinkers like Kumårila and 
Dharmak¥rti belonged, the former being an orthodox Brahmin, convinced of the intrinsic 
superiority of the Brahmins, the latter a Buddhist, and as such sceptical with regard to all such 
claims. This opposition between Brahmins and Buddhists was not created by Kumårila and 
Dharmak¥rti, to be sure. The opposition had been there right from the beginning. A number of 
SËtras in the ancient buddhist canon depict discussions between the Buddha and one or more 
Brahmins, in which the claim to superior status of the Brahmins is rejected, or even made fun 
of. With Kumårila and Dharmak¥rti this opposition took on a distinctly philosophical 
dimension, it became part of the philosophical debate of that time. The historian of philosophy 
will need to be able to place this debate in its historical situation, he will need to be aware of 
the context in order to fully understand the contents. 
 
A completely different example of a philosophical development which was, perhaps, closely 
related to a social phenomenon is constituted by a concept which came to play a role in 
buddhist thought, viz., that of the teaching-body (dharmakåya) of the Buddha.2 We know that 
worshipping the bodily remains of the Buddha was an important aspect of the religion of 
                         
2 For details, see Bronkhorst, 2005a. 
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buddhist laymen and monastics alike. These bodily remains were often preserved in stËpas. 
However, the buddhist preoccupation with dead bodies was highly impure in the eyes of their 
brahmanical neighbours. Their sensitivity to the impurity of death and all that is associated 
with it did influence the Indian Buddhists, too, as may be illustrated by the fact that they 
tended to turn their attention from the bodily relics to the stËpas, their containers, which 
became objects of worship in their own right. It is also striking that bodily remains of the 
Buddha tended to be accessible, to at least some degree, in regions which Buddhism did not 
share with Brahmanism — China, Tibet, Ceylon, but also north-western India —, but hardly 
ever in regions where Brahmanism was important. It is perhaps in these regions that buddhist 
thinkers developed the idea that the real body of the Buddha was not his physical body, but 
rather his teaching (dharma). There are, as a matter of fact, canonical statements to that effect. 
It was but a small step from here to postulating an entity called dharmakåya, teaching-body, 
and to maintain that that is the body of the Buddha that should be worshipped. The 
dharmakåya did indeed undergo a long and interesting development in buddhist thought, and 
came to be identified, in various texts, with different important concept, among them 
dharmadhåtu and tathågatagarbha; most importantly, many Buddhists came to look upon the 
dharmakåya as the absolute.3 This long development, if the hypothetical reconstruction of the 
historical background of the dharmakåya here presented is correct, began, and finds its 
original explanation, in the buddhist reaction to brahmanical social pressure. 
 
These last two examples show that knowledge of the social context of Indian philosophy 
sometimes helps the modern researcher to understand certain details of the positions taken by 
its practitioners. However, we also need knowledge of the social context to understand that 
there was such a thing as Indian philosophy at all. In a way this is self-evident. If one wishes 
to understand why there is philosophy in the modern world, it is important to know that there 
are institutions, such as universities, which provide modern philosophers with the support they 
require, such as jobs, teaching opportunities, funds for publications, etc. etc. Without such 
support, modern philosophy would have a hard time to survive. The situation in classical and 
medieval India was not different in this respect. These philosophers, too, had material and 
intellectual needs. They, too, needed an income, or at least shelter and regular meals; they 
needed access to libraries, manuscript libraries in their case; they needed to be able to pass on 
their knowledge, first of all to students, we may assume, but also to a network of other 
philosophers who read their works; etc. The Indian philosophical texts that have come down 
to us say very little about these earthly and banal realities, yet it is undeniable that, if the 
circumstances had not been right, many authors might not have been able to write their texts, 
or, even after writing them, these texts would not have been read and preserved. 
 All this amounts to saying that the very fact that there is such a thing as Indian 
                         
3 For a more detailed presentation, see Bronkhorst, 2000: 163 ff. 
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philosophy cannot be separated from the circumstances that made this possible. It seems a 
priori likely that there might not have been philosophy in South Asia if there had not been 
people who had the leisure to create and continue it. But the existence of such a group of 
people, in and by itself, might not yet have guaranteed the presence of a philosophical 
tradition. To some extent these people had this leisure, they were given this leisure, because 
other members of society thought that the study of philosophical issues was particularly 
important and represented a fundamental value of society as a whole. This we know is true. 
Most schools of Indian philosophy agreed that philosophy is necessary for those who wish to 
attain liberation from the cycle of rebirth which they all believed in; and liberation from 
rebirth is the highest aim there is. 
 So far so good. The elements considered so far do not, however, explain why Indian 
philosophy took the forms it actually took. They would explain the existence of wisdom 
teachings, perhaps in different varieties for different currents of thought. They do not explain 
why classical Indian philosophers went out of their way to argue for their positions, 
sometimes going to the extent of criticizing the positions of other thinkers, they do not explain 
why these philosophers developed logical rules and rules of debate, why they presented their 
views in the form of ever more coherent wholes, why they created systems of thought rather 
than mere collections of wise statements. Why did they do all this? Why did they not leave 
each other alone, concentrating each on his own method to attain liberation? Liberation, in 
most religious currents of India, is a highly personal attainment, quite independent of social 
considerations; why then should the way leading to it pass through philosophical debates 
whose aim is to convince, or refute others? Obviously the Indian philosophers did all they 
could to convince each other, to show that the other thinkers, if they really thought things out 
clearly, should change their opinions and convert to their own points of view. 
 At first sight one might think that Indian philosophers were concerned with convincing 
each other because this was part of their missionary intention. We know that Buddhism made 
a conscious effort to convert people, and that it was extraordinarily successful in this. Jainism, 
too, we can be sure, made efforts to convince people of the value and importance of their path 
to liberation. In spite of this, I think that the urge to convert provides at best a very small part 
of the answer to our question. Buddhism and Jainism did not, or not primarily, carry out their 
missionary activity by means of philosophical debate, but by preaching their respective 
doctrines. And Brahmanism, as is well known, was not interested in missionary activity in the 
ordinary sense at all: no one could become a Brahmin who was not already a Brahmin; 
agreement or disagreement on complex philosophical issues could not change that. 
 The correct explanation of the elements of Indian philosophy just mentioned, as I see 
it, is different. These elements are in an important sense the result of a social custom. They are 
the consequence of a feature of the social context, that has accompanied Indian philosophy for 
most of its history. This feature, this social custom, is the existence of public debates between 
philosophers of different persuasions. 
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 The history of Indian philosophy is full of references to debates that presumably had 
taken place between prominent representatives of different schools of thought. Many of these 
accounts may be legendary, or fully imaginary; others may be less than reliable because 
coloured in favour of one of the parties involved. It would yet be extremely interesting if 
someone were one day to make the effort of collecting all those accounts, whether from 
brahmanical, buddhist, or jaina sources, whether reliable or not. Such an overview might even 
include the paˆ∂itapari∑ads, the “assemblies of wise men”, that are still sometimes held in 
India, and that are occasionally organized at international Sanskrit conferences. These 
paˆ∂itapari∑ads are, to be sure, no more than fossilized survivals. But living debates, with 
sometimes serious consequences for the participants, accompanied Indian philosophy for most 
of its history. We know, for example, that the brother of Bha††oji, the philosopher and 
grammarian whom we referred to above, won a debate at the court of a South Indian king 
called Ve∫ka†appa. Given that this debate took place at the court of a king, we must conclude 
that this king allowed, or even encouraged, this debate to take place. 
 King Ve∫ka†appa was not exceptional in organizing, or allowing, such debates at his 
court. As a matter of fact, he continued a very long tradition in doing so. It is this social 
custom — it is really a social custom — which, I believe, made Indian philosophy what it is. 
Participants in such debates could win much, they could also loose all they had. Participating 
in such debates was not, therefore, a matter of mere amusement. It was through such debates 
that philosophers of different orientations combated each other, and tried to obtain a 
maximum of advantages for themselves and for the groups they represented. But since the 
stakes were so high, every potential participant had to prepare himself as well as he could. He 
had to be able to present his views, or those of his school, in such a way that an outside judge, 
sometimes the king himself, would be convinced by them. In practice this meant various 
things. First of all, mere wisdom teachings would not impress anybody. Teachings had to 
constitute coherent wholes, free from inner contradictions and loose ends. Second, the debater 
should, to the extent possible, know the ideas of his opponent, including whatever weaknesses 
it might contain. It would of course be very impressive to be able to show, during a public 
debate, that the opponent held incoherent or even nonsensical views. 
 As I said above, debates are not a recent phenomenon in Indian philosophy. For the 
middle of the first millennium CE — the classical period of Indian philosophy, we have a 
number of reports from foreign visitors. We will look at two of them in some detail. The first 
of these two derives from the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang (or Hsüan-chuang); since 
he is called GenjØ in Japanese, I will use that name in what follows. GenjØ has left us a 
detailed account of his visit to India in the first half of the seventh century of the Common 
Era. In this account he regularly mentions debates between representatives of different schools 
of thought. The debates he refers to normally took place in the presence of a king, and tended 
to end in victory for one of the two parties, and defeat for the other. According to the 
biography of GenjØ composed by his pupil Huili, GenjØ himself volunteered to participate in a 
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debate on one occasion. The event is described as follows:4 
 
At that time a heretic of the Lokåyatika school came to seek a debate and wrote his 
argument in fourteen points, which he hung on the door of the monastery, while he 
announced, ‘If anybody is able to refute any one point of my argument, I shall cut off 
my head to apologize!’ 
 After the passage of several days, nobody came out to accept the challenge. The 
Master [= GenjØ] then asked his personal servant to take down the poster, destroy it, 
and trample the broken pieces under his feet. Being greatly enraged, the Brahmin 
asked, ‘Who are you?’ The servant said in reply, ‘I am a servant of the Mahayana-
deva.’ The Brahmin, who had already heard of the fame of the Master, was ashamed of 
himself and did not say anything more. The Master sent for him and brought him to the 
presence of the Venerable Í¥labhadra [GenjØ's teacher at Nålandå Monastery], with 
various virtuous monks as witnesses, to start a debate with him about the principles of 
his school and the theories founded by other heretical sects as well.  
 
The debate as recorded in Huili’s account is somewhat one-sided, presumably because the 
Brahmin opponent is too shy to speak in the presence of GenjØ. GenjØ first demonstrates his 
knowledge of a number of brahmanical ascetic and philosophical schools, and then refutes one 
of them, supposedly the one to which his opponent belongs, in detail.5 At the end of this the 
text sums up the result: 
 
In this manner the argument was carried on with repeated refutations; and the Brahmin 
remained silent and said nothing. Then he rose to his feet and said with apology, ‘I am 
defeated, and I am ready to keep my word.’ The Master said, ‘We Buddhists do not 
take any man's life. I now make you my slave, and you should work according to my 
orders.’ The Brahmin was glad to obey the Master's orders with reverence, and was 
brought to his living quarters. All those who heard about this event praised it with 
delight. 
 
It is unlikely that this passage accurately presents what happened. It is hard to believe that a 
Brahmin who was seeking a debate would accept total defeat without as much as uttering a 
word. But nor would we expect historical accuracy in a document that primarily sings the 
glory of Master GenjØ. It will be interesting to see what kind of arguments supposedly led to 
his victory in debate. 
 The text does not offer much in terms of arguments, with one notable exception. The 
Master is recorded to have dealt with the Såµkhya system of thought in a rather more detailed 
manner. First he presents an outline of the system, which agrees with what we know about it. 
After this exposition he draws attention to what he considers its lack of coherence. It is not 
likely that a real Såµkhya would have felt defeated by the reflections brought to bear on their 
system by the Chinese pilgrim. It is yet interesting to see that GenjØ is here depicted as 
presenting what is an accurate description of the main features of the Såµkhya philosophy, 
and that, having presented this outline, he tries to show its inner incoherence. The 
                         
4 Li, 1995: 132 f. (modified); translates pp. 245a-c. 
5 Surprisingly, GenjØ refutes the Såµkhya school of thought, even though his opponent is a Lokåyatika. On this 
question, see Bronkhorst, 2007: 309 f. 
THE CONTEXT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY  9 
 
 
fundamental assumptions of this philosophy do not, according to the position attributed to 
GenjØ, justify the functions it ascribes to the various entities it postulates. 
 Accounts like this are extremely interesting, and give us a glimpse, if ever so faint, of 
situations India's philosophers may have been familiar with. In the present context it is 
noteworthy to see what could be at stake in such debates. GenjØ’s unfortunate opponent was 
lucky to get away with his life, and be merely reduced to the state of being GenjØ’s slave. We 
do not know to what extent we are here confronted with an exaggeration on the part of 
GenjØ’s  biographer, but we will see that death as a result of a lost debate is a recurring theme. 
But even without death or loss of individual liberty, there can be no doubt that debaters could 
lose their reputation once and for all, and with it whatever privileges were reserved for their 
group or community. Winning a debate could be very advantageous. Elsewhere GenjØ reports 
that Í¥labhadra, the same Master also mentioned in the preceding passage, had once defeated a 
Brahmin in a debate, after which he had received from the local king the revenues of a certain 
city.6 
 Let us now turn to the second example, situated a few centuries before the time of 
GenjØ. It depicts a debate between a Buddhist and a Såµkhya in which, this time, the latter is 
victorious. The story is found in Paramårtha's The Life of Vasubandhu. The main character is 
the Såµkhya teacher Vindhyavåsa, who modified the Såµkhya doctrine and came to think 
that the doctrine set forth by him was the greatest, and that nothing could be superior to it. 
However, Buddhism was flourishing in the world at that time. Vindhyavåsa therefore resolved 
to refute it. The text continues:7 
 
Accordingly he went to the country of Ayodhyå and beat the drum of dispute with his 
head and said: 
(The translator of this passage explains in a note that, according to a commentator, ‘it 
was customary for a king in India to keep a drum at the Royal Gate. When a man wants 
to appeal to the Court or to challenge a dispute, he has to beat it.’) 
‘I will dispute (with any Buddhist Íramaˆa). If I am defeated my opponent shall cut my 
head off; but if, on the contrary, he is beaten, he shall give me his head.’ The King, 
Vikramåditya ..., being informed of the matter summoned the heretic and asked him 
about it, whereupon the latter answered: ‘Thou art, O King, the Lord of the Land, in 
whose mind there should be no partial love to either Íramaˆas or Brahmins. If there be 
any doctrines prevailing (in thy country) thou shouldst put them to the test (and see 
whether) they are right or wrong. Now I intend (to dispute) with a disciple of Íåkya-
muni [= the Buddha] to determine which party is the winner or the loser. Each should 
vow to stake his own head.’ The King thereupon gave him permission and despatched 
men to ask all the Buddhist teachers of the country in the following words: ‘Is there 
anyone who is able to oppose this heretic? Whosoever thinks himself competent should 
dispute with him.’ 
 At that time the great Teachers of the Law, Manoratha, Vasubandhu, and others were 
all absent travelling in other countries. ... 
 There was at home only Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu. ... This Teacher of 
the Law was formerly very learned, but he was now advanced in years and therefore 
weak in mind and feeble in his speech. He said: ‘Now the great champions of the Law 
                         
6 Watters, 1904-05/1973: II: 109-110. 
7 Takakusu, 1904: 283 f. Cp. the discussion in Larson & Bhattacharya, 1987: 131 f. 
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are all abroad. The heretic is strong and obstinate and must not be let alone any longer. 
I will now see to it myself.’ He informed the King, who appointed a day on which he 
summoned a great assembly to the hall of discussion, where the heretic and the 
Buddhist teacher were to meet and dispute. 
 The heretic said: ‘Will you first set forth your opinion? Or will you refute the opinion 
first set forth by me?’ The priest replied: ‘I am like a great ocean which swallows up 
all that comes. You are like a lump of earth which will be submerged if it comes to the 
ocean. You may do as you like.’ His opponent said: ‘Then you had better set forth your 
own opinion (first). I will refute it.’ 
 The Buddhist teacher, thereupon, set forth his doctrine of impermanence and said: ‘All 
composite things are in process of destruction every moment, why? because they 
disappear in the end.’ He further supported this by various arguments. The heretic 
opponent could repeat all these arguments of the Buddhist priest after once hearing 
them and began to criticise them one by one by processes of reasoning. On being 
requested to commit to memory and repeat these refutations the priest failed to do so. 
He could not even re-construct his own arguments, though requested to do so. 
 Thus the Buddhist priest was completely defeated. The heretic said: ‘You are a 
Brahmin by caste and I also am a Brahmin. We are not allowed to kill. I will beat you 
on the back instead, in order to show that I am the victor.’ He did so. The king gave 
him three lacs of gold as a prize. On receiving the gold he distributed it among the 
people at large and returned to the Vindhya mountain where he entered a rocky cave.” 
 
The story has a happy ending after all, for Vasubandhu, after his return, composed a work 
criticising the Såµkhya doctrine in such a competent manner that the heretics had nothing left 
for them to fall back upon. In this way, without meeting Vindhyavåsa, Vasubandhu took full 
vengeance on him and wiped off the disgrace put upon his teacher. 
 
These examples show that loosing a debate could have serious consequences, and winning one 
could have serious advantages. It is not surprising that debating manuals were produced, some 
of which have survived. Public debates had to be won, and all possible means were used in 
order to attain that goal. This included trickery, but also straightforward, and soundly based, 
criticism of each other's positions. It is this aspect of the debate tradition which has no doubt 
exerted a lasting influence. Criticism directed at others and criticism received from others had 
the unavoidable effect that all participants in these debates straightened out their own 
positions. Incoherent or inconsistent views might not survive scrutiny, not by an opponent in 
debate, but neither by the thinker who did not wish to be exposed by those who disagreed with 
him. 
 It is in this way that a social custom — viz., organizing public debates, preferably at 
the court of a king or local ruler — was responsible for one of the most striking features of 
Indian philosophy: the search for coherent systems of thought. Interestingly, we know much 
more about the effect of this social custom than about the social custom itself. Our sources 
inform us in great detail about the systems of thought that were elaborated, and only 
occasionally about the debates that took place. The connection between these two seems to me 
yet close enough to allow us to draw conclusions with regard to periods from which we have 
very little information about the social context. I suggest that, wherever Indian philosophy 
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gave rise to coherent systems of thought, we can conclude from this that a debate tradition 
made this possible, or even necessary. Note at this point that not all of Indian thought is 
coherent and systematic. Most of the religious literature of India contains ideas which are not 
put into the straightjacket of a system of thought. Examples are the early Upani∑ads, the 
philosophical portions of the Mahåbhårata, and much else. Systematic thought in India 
dwindles in comparison with the quantity of non-systematized thought. Yet it is systematic 
thought that interests us at present, because it reveals something about the social context in 
which it could arise and flourish. 
 If, with this in mind, we look at the earliest manifestations of systematic thought in 
India, our attention is inevitably drawn to the scholastic development which Buddhism 
underwent during the last centuries preceding the Common Era. Buddhist scholasticism of 
that period, called abhidharma, has mainly survived in two bodies of texts, belonging to two 
schools of Buddhism. One of the two, belonging to the Theravåda school of Buddhism, shows 
an ongoing refinement, but little or no attempt to develop a coherent system of thought. The 
other school, Sarvåstivåda, is altogether different. Several texts of its canonical “Basket of 
scholasticism” (abhidharma-pi†aka) show that serious attempts at systematization were made 
in this school. Since the innovations concerned were made on the basis of traditional material, 
the result is often quite complex, and this is not the place to deal with them in full detail.8 
Only some striking features must here be mentioned. The Sarvåstivåda conception of the 
world is essentially atomistic. The macroscopic, and therefore composite, objects which we 
are acquainted with from everyday experience do not really exist. What really exist are the 
ultimate constituents, called dharmas. A particularly important composite object is the human 
person which, too, does not really exist. The atomistic understanding of the world also finds 
expression in the belief in momentariness: nothing exists for more than a single moment.9 
Various questions linked to this atomistic vision of the world are raised and often answered by 
introducing an appropriate dharma. The question, for example, how different bundles of 
dharmas stick together so as to form different persons (remember that persons do strictly 
speaking not exist), is answered with the introduction of a dharma called pråpti ‘possession’. 
Other difficulties were connected with the belief that mental events occur only one at a time in 
one person. This leads to difficulties in the case where someone observes, say, his own desire. 
This activity involves two mental events, the observation and the desire, which cannot 
simultaneously exist. When the observation is present, the observed desire must of necessity 
be non-present. Observation of a desire is therefore only possible if a non-present object (the 
desire) exists. The Sarvåstivådins concluded from this that past and future exist. This 
particular view, incidentally, is responsible for their name, Sarvåstivåda, the “position (våda) 
according to which everything (sarva) exists (asti)”. Sarvåstivåda, as will be clear from this 
                         
8 For a slightly more detailed, but still incomplete, presentation, see Bronkhorst, 2000: 76-127. 
9 Momentariness is not explicitly mentioned in early Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma texts, but can quite safely be 
attributed to their authors; see Bronkhorst, 1995. 
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very brief presentation, made a major effort to rationalise its teachings, Theravåda did not. 
Sarvåstivåda played a major role in the tradition of debate that came to involve all schools of 
philosophy, whether Buddhist, Brahmanical, or Jaina; it seems even likely that the 
Sarvåstivådins were the first to adhere to this tradition of debate in India. Theravåda played no 
such role, and indeed left India before this tradition of debate had attained a prominent 
position. 
 What can we conclude from these attempts at systematization carried out, apparently 
for the first time, by the Sarvåstivådins of north-western India? I am tempted to conclude that 
the same social context which made systematization possible and necessary in later times, 
existed already in the last centuries BCE in north-western India, perhaps for the first time. The 
Buddhists of that time and region clearly felt the need to present their more sophisticated 
views in such a manner that outsiders would not easily find systematic weaknesses in them. 
Just like their later colleagues, they had to defend their positions, quite possibly during public 
debates. 
 This conclusion raises a number of questions. Who were the rulers in north-western 
India who might organize debates at their courts or elsewhere? With whom might the 
Buddhists of north-western India have been asked to debate? Who were their opponents? 
Don’t forget that we have no evidence of the existence of systematic brahmanical thought 
during this early period. What is more, there are good reasons to think that there were few, if 
any, Brahmins in the regions inhabited by the Buddhists of north-western India — primarily 
Gandhåra, perhaps also Bactria. These regions were ruled, for at least some of the time that 
concerns us, by Greeks. We know that Hellenistic kings in general cultivated the presence of 
philosophers at their courts, and encouraged debates between them. Is it possible that the 
social context which was to accompany Indian philosophy practically throughout its long 
history, the debates that made the formulation of critical and systematic philosophy a 
necessity, is it possible that all this began at the Greek courts of north-western India? I think 
there is much that pleads in favour of this possibility.10 We know that a number of Greeks 
from that area were interested in Buddhism, even converted to that religion. The text called 
“The questions of king Milinda” shows that, in the imagination of at least some later 
Buddhists, the Greeks and their kings, most notably Menander, had participated in discussions 
with Buddhists. It is also known that, even after the Greeks had lost power in north-western 
India, their influence took centuries before ebbing away completely. 
 
At this point you may raise the following objection. You will admit that a certain knowledge 
of the context is required to understand at least certain issues dealt with in Indian philosophy. 
You are even willing to grant that context has to be considered in order to understand that 
there is such a thing as Indian philosophy at all. However, you will say, what we need to know 
                         
10 Cf. Bronkhorst, 1999. 
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about this context is relatively little. Two of the cases we have discussed show this. Yes, to 
understand some aspects of Indian philosophy we need to know that many Indian 
philosophers were Brahmins, people who claimed a privileged status in society, while others, 
most notably the Buddhists, did not accept that claim. And yes, you will continue, to 
understand the inner dynamic of Indian philosophy one must know that public debates were a 
recurring phenomenon throughout its long history. However, you will insist, both these 
contextual features are as old as Indian philosophy; they have accompanied it from beginning 
to end. Even after the disappearance of Buddhism from the Indian philosophical scene, 
debates continued, as we saw in the case of Bha††oji. In other words, you will conclude, only 
contextual features that have not changed in any essential manner need to be known to 
understand Indian philosophy. Other contextual features, features that changed over the period 
of two thousand years or more since the beginning of systematic philosophy in India, such 
other features are of little importance for the study and understanding of this tradition. 
 This objection is not justified in my opinion. It is true that two of the four examples so 
far discussed concerned contextual features of great temporal endurance. Both the 
brahmanical claim of social superiority and the tradition of public debate had a long life, as 
long as Indian philosophy itself. Yet it would be a mistake to look upon these two features as 
constants, as some unchangeable and permanent background to the development of Indian 
philosophy. They were not, as a matter of fact. Some schools of thought developed in 
environments where there were neither tradition of debate, nor sophisticated opponents ready 
to criticize their thought in detail. There is also reason to think that the tradition of debate was 
not always equally strong. I will briefly discuss one example for each of these two cases. 
 I have already briefly mentioned the Theravåda school of Buddhism, contemporaneous 
with the Sarvåstivåda school which we studied in some detail. Both these schools developed 
and preserved an important body of scholastic literature, called Abhidharma. The Sarvåstivåda 
school, as we saw, remodelled their Abhidharma into a coherent system of thought. The 
Theravådins did no such thing. This can be seen by considering one of their texts, which is 
one of the earliest surviving texts in India dedicated to criticising the positions of others. It is 
called Kathåvatthu “Text dealing with disputes”, and was composed, according to tradition, 
218 years after the death of the Buddha.11 It criticises in its oldest portions a position which 
we know was held by the Sarvåstivådins, mentioned earlier. An analysis of the criticism 
presented in the Kathåvatthu shows that its author had not understood, and had perhaps no 
knowledge whatsoever of, the arguments used by the Sarvåstivådins to justify their position. 
The Sarvåstivådins held that past and future exist, and their argumentation, as we have seen, 
was built on their fundamental belief that no two mental events can simultaneously occur in 
one person. The author of the Kathåvatthu presents instead an argument that is totally 
nonsensical.12 The Kathåvatthu, then, is a text which criticises the positions of others without 
                         
11 Hinüber, 1996: 70 f. 
12 Bronkhorst, 1993. 
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being properly informed about them (at least in this case). No need to say that its uninformed 
criticism carried little weight. The Sarvåstivådins did not, and did not need to, change their 
views as a result of the criticism expressed in this Theravåda text. What is more, the 
Theravådins felt no need to tighten up their own views and develop them into a coherent 
whole. The question is why? The answer I propose is that the Kathåvatthu was written in a 
part of India where public debate had not yet forced its author or authors to introduce 
coherence in their own thought, and had not yet urged them to inform themselves with regard 
to the details of the opinions they disagreed with. The authors of the Kathåvatthu were under 
no pressure to do all this, and the result of this is visible in their text. 
 Regarding the tradition of debate, our information about it is only lacunary, and I have 
already given expression to the desirability of further research in this domain. It seems yet 
clear that this social institution was during some periods more active, more alive, than during 
others. In order to illustrate this, I return once again to the philosopher and grammarian 
Bha††oji D¥k∑ita, discussed at the beginning of this lecture. I have told you already that this 
thinker lived in Benares, around the year 1600 CE. Bha††oji and his nephew Kauˆ∂a Bha††a 
are known for the new development in the so-called “philosophy of grammar” which they 
initiated. In this philosophy they made use of a new technical terminology that had been 
created some centuries earlier by thinkers of the Navya-Nyåya, i.e. “New Logic”, school of 
thought. Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a introduced this terminology into grammatical thought, 
from where another school of thought, that of Vedic Hermeneutics (M¥måµså), appears to 
have borrowed it to use it for its own purposes. 
 The question that presents itself here is the following. Why did it take several centuries 
before the new technical terminology was taken over by grammarians and Vedic Hermeneuts? 
And why was it then taken over by both grammarians and Vedic Hermeneuts, almost 
simultaneously, in the city of Benares? The new terminology was apparently used for several 
centuries inside one school, with hardly anyone bothering to take notice (even though Prof. 
Wada informs me that certain Vedåntins may have started using it somewhat earlier than the 
grammarians and Vedic Hermeneuts). How can this be explained? The answer, as I see it, lies 
in the fact that Benares around the year 1600 was a centre where debate between 
representatives of different schools of thought had been revived, for reasons which are too 
complex to analyse here at present. For some centuries before this time, philosophical schools 
existed and even flourished in a certain sense. However, they remained largely isolated from 
each other. A new centre and a new political and social situation were required to oblige these 
philosophers again to take serious notice of what happened in other schools of thought. 
 
I think I have said enough about the changeability of the context in which Indian philosophy 
began and developed. To conclude, I would like to very briefly touch upon an aspect of Indian 
philosophy which is claimed to be central to it. I had occasion to point out that most schools 
of Indian philosophy agree that philosophy is necessary to attain liberation from the cycle of 
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rebirth. How practical was this claim? How serious were Indian philosophers about reaching 
this aim during this life? Was this claim mere lip-service to a high ideal, without practical 
consequences, or did Indian thinkers combine the study of philosophy with other activities 
they believed were necessary to reach the highest goal? 
 It is not possible to answer these questions in general terms that are valid for all Indian 
philosophers. The seriousness with which thinkers dedicated themselves to the attainment of 
liberation may have differed from one school to the next, from one person to the other. In 
many cases it is extremely difficult, or even impossible, to find information that may allow us 
to answer these questions. It is for this reason all the more interesting to refer to some recent 
studies that throw light on the practical commitment to liberation among Buddhist monks of 
north-western India during the first centuries of the Common Era. I am referring to the studies 
of Gregory Schopen, more specifically to those that have recently been brought out in a 
collection called Buddhist Monks and Business Matters (2004). Many of these studies are 
based, at least in part, on a detailed analysis of portions of the large collection of monastic 
rules known by the name MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya, which appears to date from that period. It 
is not possible to do full justice to Schopen’s volume here. All I can do is quote a short 
passage which contains a clear statement about the issue that interests us:13 
 
Forty years ago André Bareau said not just about [the MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya] but 
about all Buddhist monastic Codes: “It is  true that the Vinayapi†akas ... do not breathe 
a word about the numerous spiritual practices, meditations, contemplations, etc., which 
constituted the very essence of the Buddhist ‘religion’.” And although this is 
something of an exaggeration, still it should have given pause for thought. Our Code, 
for example, does refer to ascetic, meditating monks, but when it does so in any detail, 
such monks almost always appear as the butt of jokes, objects of ridicule, and — not 
uncommonly — sexual deviants. They are presented as irresponsible and of the type 
that give the order a bad name. There are texts in our Code where, for example, 
ascetic, cemetery monks manage only to terrify children; where ascetic monks who 
wear robes made from cemetery cloth are not even allowed into the monastery, let 
alone allowed to sit on a mat that belongs to the Community; tales whose only point 
seems to be to indicate that meditation makes you stupid; texts about monks who 
meditate in the forest and cannot control their male member and so end up smashing it 
between two rocks, whereupon the Buddha tells them, while they are howling in pain, 
that they, unfortunately, have smashed the wrong thing — they should have smashed 
desire; and a tale about another monk who meditated in the forest and, to avoid being 
seduced by a goddess, had to tie his legs shut. The goddess being put off by this then 
flung him through the air, and he landed — still legs tied — on top of the king, who 
was sleeping on the roof of his palace. The king, of course, was not amused and made 
it known to the Buddha that it would not do to have his monks being flung around the 
countryside in the middle of the night. The Buddha then actually made a rule 
forbidding monks to meditate in the forest! Texts and tales of this sort are numerous in 
our Code. 
 
Remember that these remarks are made about the MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya, an expression 
which Schopen translates either “the Original Vinaya of the Sarvåstivådins” or “the Vinaya of 
                         
13 Schopen, 2004: 26. 
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the Original Sarvåstivådins” (p. 25). Either way a link with the Sarvåstivådins is implied by its 
very title. The Sarvåstivådins, you may recall, where among the first systematic philosophers 
of India. Schopen’s observations suggest that these philosophers, who in theory subscribed to 
the connection between philosophy and liberation, were in practice united in a monastic 
corporation which had no place whatsoever for monks who wished to meditate. 
 This is not the occasion to elaborate the implications of these observations. It is 
however clear that here we may be confronted with a situation in which the context and the 
contents of the philosophical writings concerned do not easily fit together. The question does 
require further reflection, but it does seem allowable to conclude that these Buddhists from the 
first centuries CE only paid lip-service to the ideals which were supposed to be the 
justification of their philosophical efforts. 
 
Indian philosophy is not a collection of timeless truths. Like everything else, its doctrines 
were produced in certain times and in certain places — in other words, within a context. 
Extracting Indian philosophy from of the context in which it was created is doing it an 
injustice. Worse still, it may deprive us of possibilities of understanding which only an 
awareness of context can provide. Why did Indian philosophers accept these ideas rather than 
others? Why did they defend them the way they did? What was philosophy good for in their 
eyes? These and many other questions can only be answered by situating the texts and their 
authors in their own environments, by finding out what was important for them, which were 
the problems they had to deal with, etc. Any other way of trying to understand Indian 
philosophy, for example by merely looking at questions and issues that it has in common with 
modern western philosophy, is fundamentally mistaken, and may give rise to major 
misunderstandings. Context, seen in this way, is not an extra, an indulgence for those who are 
interested in it. No. Trying to understand Indian philosophy in its own historical context is 
obligatory, the only way one may hope to arrive at an optimal understanding. 
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